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reduces murder to manslaughter, as does its broader modern incarnation, the mitigation for extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED). 1 Second, the "diminished capacity" defense can provide a mitigation or, in some jurisdictions, a complete defense, if the offender's mental illness negatesmakes it impossible to prove that the offender had-a required offense culpability element.
2 This doctrine is also referred to, more accurately and usefully, as mental illness negating an offense element (MINOE).
3 Finally, the insanity defense can provide a complete excuse depending upon the effects of an offender's mental illness at the time of the offense. 4 This brief Essay reviews these doctrines, their various formulations, and their adoption in the fifty-two American jurisdictions. 5 One goal is to get a clear view of the legal landscape in the area. With fifty-two jurisdictions, too many of us are left to guess or to rely upon the existing common wisdom on the issue. Beyond that, however, the study introduces a methodology that might be useful in a variety of contexts: comparing the pattern of interrelation of a doctrine's adoption in different states and the pattern of adoption of different but related doctrines within the same state. 6 The approach has the potential to tell us not only something about the doctrines at hand, but also something about the lawmaking process that produced them.
I. THE DOCTRINES & THEIR POPULARITY
Each of the three doctrines appears in a variety of formulations in the states. The analysis in Part I reviews the approach of each state on each doctrine and groups together states with similar approaches. 7 In the three tables below, the first column summarizes the various approaches, arranged from the narrowest at the bottom to the broadest at the top (broadest in the sense of providing a mitigation or excuse to the greatest number of cases). The second column in each table describes the kinds of cases that are added by the category over the more-narrow category immediately below it. So, for example, Table  1 's row 4 adds control impairment to the scope of the defense in row 3. The final column, on the far right of each table, identifies the states that take that approach. Each category groups together formulations of similar overall effect, although the formulations may be different in many minor respects. The table 2014 ]
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categorizations are drawn from statutory and, where that is lacking, caselaw authorities, which are collected in the Citation Table in the Appendix.
A. A Survey of American Jurisdictions
As to the first doctrine, six states have abolished the general excuse of insanity.
8 Twenty-one states follow the most common approach and recognize the defense, but with the most narrow formulation of the common-law M'Naghten test, which requires that the actor not know the nature of his conduct or that it is wrong. 9 Eight more states and the federal system keep with this approach of allowing the defense only for a purely cognitive dysfunction, but broaden the test somewhat by allowing it if the actor could not fully "appreciate" the criminality of his conduct, an approach taken from the Model Penal Code's formulation of the cognitive prong for the defense. 10 The remaining sixteen jurisdictions go beyond this to recognize some form of a control prong, which allows the defense even if an actor appreciates the criminality of his conduct but is unable to control it.
11 This is the Model Penal 8. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2014) ("It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.035 (West 2013) ("A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, guilty but mentally ill or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill."); Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 78 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) ("No act committed by a person while in a state of insanity or voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his insanity or intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining the purpose, motive or intent.").
9. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (West 2014) ("A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 2014) ("A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong."); Price v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va. 1984); Herbin v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 226, 230 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T] he actual M'Naghten test for insanity, stated in the disjunctive, is the rule in Virginia."). Under the M'Naghten test "it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Price, 323 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting M'Naghten Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (P.C.) 722-23).
10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2013) ("It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense."); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1(a) (2014) ("It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012 ) ("In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or serious mental disorder, the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct.").
11. As to the second doctrine, while it is often referred to as the "diminished capacity" or "partial insanity" defense, it is nothing of the sort. In fact, it is just the reverse: rather than providing a defense, in most jurisdictions it imputes to an actor a required offense culpability element that he does not in fact have by barring the introduction of mental illness evidence that would negate the required element.
14 In sixteen states, no offense culpability element of any kind may be negated by evidence of mental illness. 15 State v. Labranche, 942 A.2d 1284 , 1286 -87 (N.H. 2008 (interpreting the statute to allow a defense when defendants "suffered from a mental illness and that the crime charged was a product of that illness"). Virginia is included in the control-prong group (4) because, while it defines insanity using the M'Naghten standard, it has a separate "irresistible impulse" defense that essentially adds a narrow control prong to the insanity defense. See Herbin, 503 S.E.2d at 230.
14. illness to negate only a specific intent. 16 Only twenty-three jurisdictions, a minority of the fifty-two, take the Model Penal Code approach of allowing mental illness evidence to negate any element. 17 Here are the specific jurisdictions that take each approach.
the defendant lacked the specific mens rea required for the commission of the offense charged.' The legislature's decision not to adopt this section of the Model Penal Code evidences its rejection of the use of psychological testimony to challenge the mens rea element of a crime." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); State v. Jones, 359 So. 2d 95, 98 (La. 1978 ) ("Louisiana is among the minority of eleven states that still reject the defense [diminished responsibility] in all aspects. In Louisiana, a mental defect or disorder, short of legal insanity (i.e., the incapability to distinguish between right and wrong, La.R.S. 14:14), cannot serve to negate the specific intent and reduce the degree of the crime."); Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26, 32 (S.C. 2001) ("The diminished capacity doctrine allows a defendant to offer evidence of his mental condition with respect to his capacity to achieve the mens rea required for the commission of the offense charged. In particular, the defense may be invoked to negate specific intent, where such intent is an element of the offense charged. Diminished capacity differs from the insanity defense in that it may be raised by a defendant who has conceded to be legally sane. The trial judge did not err by refusing to charge diminished capacity because it is not recognized in South Carolina." (citations omitted)).
16. See, e.g., Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008 ) ("The diminished responsibility defense allows a defendant to negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to some mental defect she did not have the capacity to form that specific intent."); State v. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-008, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845 ("Thus, we conclude that evidence of the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the crime may be introduced, not only for the purpose of proving the inability to deliberate, but also to prove that the conditions were such that Defendant did not in fact, at the time of the killing, form a deliberate intent to kill." (emphasis omitted)); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 90 (Pa. 2012 ) ("A diminished capacity defense does not exculpate the defendant from criminal liability entirely, but instead negates the element of specific intent."); State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I. 1987) ("By adopting the diminished-capacity defense, we thus expanded the rule enunciated in Vanasse . . . to allow evidence that a defendant's mental capacity was diminished by reasons other than intoxication to negate the proof of specific intent required to convict a defendant of certain offenses, if those offenses included lesser, general-intent crimes of which the defendant could be convicted instead. Hence, evidence of trauma or mental disease not quite amounting to legal insanity may now be introduced, as intoxication always could, to defend one charged with a specific-intent crime.").
17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020(a) (2012) ("Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a culpable mental state which is an element of the crime."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-401 (West 2014) ("Evidence that the defendant was affected by a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is required to establish an element of the offense."); State v. Messier, 497 A.2d 740, 743 (Vt. 1985) ("Evidence offered by a defendant to prove such a mental disease or defect may or may not also operate to disprove the existence of mental states, such as intent or premeditation, which might be essential elements of the crime.").
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[Vol. 47:19 As to the third doctrine, a large majority of jurisdictions-forty of the fifty-two-reject the Model Penal Code's attempt to broaden the common-law provocation defense, which typically mitigates murder to manslaughter. 18 The remaining dozen states adopt the third doctrine by statutory formulation based upon the Model Penal Code-giving a mitigation for a killing under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
19 -although eight of those states drop the reference to "mental" and look only to "emotional disturbance." 20 Here are the specific jurisdictions. under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03(A). Several states appear to allow provocation to be a complete defense if it qualifies as "excusable homicide." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (West 2014) 19. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(2) (West 2014) ("In a prosecution for murder or attempted murder in the first and second degrees it is an affirmative defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter or attempted manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time the defendant caused the death of the other person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. The reasonableness of the explanation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2(1)(a) (2014) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter when he causes the death of another: (a) Under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation but which would otherwise constitute murder. . . .").
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(1)(A) (West & Supp. 2013) ("A person commits manslaughter if: (1)(A) The person causes the death of another person under circumstances that would be murder, except that he or she causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which 
B. Discussion
Two striking conclusions come from these displays. First, there is enormous variation in the formulation of the three doctrines across the fifty-two jurisdictions. It is not the case that a majority rule exists with outliers. Instead, we see large groups of states taking significantly different approaches than other large groups. And this is true even though, as noted above, each of the three or four categorizations used in a table group together formulations, among which, there is some variation. That is, the tables understate the degree of variation, yet still show enormous diversity.
Also look at Table 7 below. The states that take the same approach to the three doctrines are marked in the right-hand column with the same letter. 21 That column shows that there are at least eighteen different patterns of formulation (A through R) of these three doctrines into the general groupings.
22
A second conclusion-that at least this writer finds striking-is the level of stinginess of most states in the excuses and mitigations they offer. Recall that during the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of the states codified or recodified their criminal law based in some significant part on the Model Penal Code, which was promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1962. 23 § 210.3 n.24 (1962) . But both states now use language invoking the common-law provocation defense, allowing the defense when a crime that would otherwise be murder is committed "in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation" or "under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation." ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 203 (2014) 
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overlapped in some way. Because there is so much diversity in approach, it would seem that all manner of overlaps, or gaps, are possible. As the tables above show, there are at least four general approaches to formulating the insanity defense, three approaches to formulating the MINOE doctrine, and three approaches to formulating provocation/EMED. 30 And, as the tables below make clear, these formulations occur in a host of combinations-eleven different combinations of insanity by MINOE, nine different combinations of insanity by EMED, and seven different combinations of MINOE by EMED. 31 As noted above, there are eighteen different three-way combinations.
32
Are there discernable patterns to the combinations of approaches that a jurisdiction takes on these three issues? If so, is there some logic to the patterns? Legislatures, courts, and scholars sometimes make claims or assumptions about how the doctrines interact with one another. For example, it is sometimes argued that a particular formulation of one doctrine is appropriate because of the existence or breadth of another doctrine. Thus, it has been argued that we can abolish the insanity defense because MINOE is available to provide a defense for mental illness, 33 and conversely, that MINOE is an insufficient substitute for an insanity defense, 34 and that we do not need and should not have a control prong in an insanity defense because the provocation defense already takes such matters into account. 35 In other instances, a court or a legislature may define the scope of one doctrine by excluding from it situations covered by another. 36 For example, the insanity defense has been defined to exclude the conditions traditionally associated with provocation. 37 In still other instances, scholars have analyzed whether there are constitutional limits to adopting a position on one doctrine according to the position the jurisdiction takes on another.
38
Are there, then, discernible patterns to the position a jurisdiction takes on the three doctrines, and is there a logic in the patterns? These are particularly interesting questions to criminal law scholars who would like their logical 
A. Insanity and MINOE
Consider the interrelation of the insanity and MINOE formulations in Table 4 . Some cells seem to have some logic to them. The cell in the upper-right-hand corner contains states that give the broadest insanity formulation as well as the broadest MINOE formulation, following the Model Penal Code's lead in both respects. They seem to show a consistent approach: wanting a full and broad assessment of an offender's blameworthiness.
The states in the lower-right-hand corner have abolished the insanity defense, so one would think that they hardly have a choice other than to provide a fairly robust MINOE doctrine. But note the resistance of North Dakota to this reasoning: it abolishes insanity but also limits MINOE. 40 Similarly, the states in the upper-left-hand corner, having barred any MINOE, may have felt compelled to give a fairly broad insanity defense.
But then come the many states in the lowest-populated left-hand corner, which not only bar any MINOE, but also allow the most narrow formulation of an insanity defense: the bare M'Naghten rule. Clearly they are suspicious of, if not hostile to the idea of mental illness mitigating or excusing liability. There is rich literature on such suspicions, but it would seem difficult for a state to claim to be committed to the principle of justice when it acts upon such suspicions in this way. 
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So there might seem to be some logic to the placement of jurisdictions in one cell or another, but those lines of argument are contradictory with one another. Do the states sharing a cell really reflect this shared point of view, or is the pattern one sees in the table just a product of essentially disconnected formulation decisions producing a somewhat random distribution in which, by chance, most cells get filled?
B. Insanity and Provocation/EMED (Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance)
Consider the interrelation of the insanity and provocation formulations in Table 5 . EMED and EED are so generally rejected that there is not much interactive effect to speculate about, but there are a few interesting points. Every state that follows the common law's M'Naghten rule for insanity also rejects any broadening of provocation from its common-law form. This trend is perhaps no surprise. 42 Most of these states never had a modern recodification based upon the Model Penal Code. 43 Showing the same logic, the states that go the farthest in following the Model Penal Code's broadening of insanity (to include a control prong) are also the states most likely to adopt the Model Penal Code's EMED or EED broadening of provocation. 1377, 1390-91 (1997) In searching for a silver lining, one might observe that the chart shows a certain consistency in approach. It suggests that a state's formulations are not the product of a completely random process without rhyme or reason. On the other hand, one might wonder about the dynamics of the lower-right-hand cells-North Dakota, Utah, Montana, and Nevada. These states have abolished the insanity defense, yet followed the Model Penal Code's broadening of common-law provocation. 44 It is not obvious that there is a logical reason that would tie these two positions together. Perhaps we are back to randomness in effect. Or perhaps there is a structural-process effect at work here rather than the effect of a reasoned explanation. 45 One might speculate that the "small-state" effect is at work in these four states, leading them to follow the Model Penal Code's broader EMED or EED, but because insanity is a high-profile defense, it is one of the few issues that would attract attention and provoke political debate, leading to its abolition. 46 Note too that the four states are geographically close, which creates the possibility that debates in one state may spill over to have an effect next door.
C. MINOE and Provocation/EMED (Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance)
Consider the interrelation of the provocation and MINOE doctrines in Table 6 . The lower-left-hand cell contains jurisdictions that reject both the Model Penal Code's attempt to broaden common-law provocation and its attempt to allow the introduction of mental illness evidence that would negate a required offense element. Most of these states never codified or recodified their criminal 44 . See supra 
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law during the wave of the 1960s and 1970s. 47 The lower-right-hand cell kept common-law provocation, as most states did, yet adopted full MINOE per the Model Penal Code-an interesting combination of views.
The two upper-right-hand cells are even more interesting, but for a different reason. They follow the Model Penal Code in providing both full MINOE and broad EMED or at least EED. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that five of the eight states also adopt the broader insanity formulation, recognizing a control prong as the Model Penal Code does. But the other three-Montana, Nevada, and Utah-abolish the insanity defense altogether! There is no middle ground.
What is going on here? Why only the extremes? One could speculate, with no real evidence, that this is an example of the small-state effect, where these eight states all dutifully followed the Model Penal Code, but in three of the states, the insanity defense caught the spotlight and ended up getting the full public-panic treatment.
48 Why in those three states and not the other five? Perhaps we see here a certain randomness in the criminal lawmaking process, including the effect of timing, local news coverage, local politics, and other such special factors unrelated to logical analysis.
D. States Sharing the Same Approach to All Three Doctrines
The variety of combinations that one sees in the two-way tables above, as one might guess, is even more exaggerated when one looks at the variety of three-way combinations. P4 -EMED = MPC broader form including mental disturbance P3 -EED = MPC version P2 -CL prov = "heat of passion," etc. ______________________________________________________
In Table 7 , the states that share the same approach to all three doctrines share the same letter in the far right column. The level of diversity is striking. Eighteen different combinations of approaches exist (A through R). The most common pattern is C, with ten states following it. After that, the largest group consists of six states sharing a pattern (J), five states sharing two patterns (B and E), and five groups of three states sharing different patterns (D, F, H, L, and M). Finally, three pairs of states share a pattern (A, I, and N), and another six states have a unique combination (Delaware, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Utah).
The single largest group, pattern C, consists of states that tend to follow the common-law rule, unaffected by the Model-Penal-Code-based recodifications. They adopt the most narrow formulation of each of the three doctrines.
Beyond that, the states are seriously splintered in their approaches. One might conclude that the Model Penal Code did have an effect, not so much in gaining adherents to its formulations, but at least in pushing most states from their strict reliance upon the common-law approach--usually to some place short of the Model Penal Code position.
34
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III. CONCLUSION
What conclusions can one draw from this analysis of the state approaches to these three doctrines: insanity, MINOE, and provocation/EMED? Several points have already been hinted at.
First, there is an astounding level of diversity among the American jurisdictions regarding the approaches to each doctrine (Tables 1 through 3) and among the different combinations of approaches taken to the three doctrines (Tables 4 through 6)-most of the cells in the latter tables are populated. 49 And from Table 7 we see that, on average, a state shares its pattern of formulation of these doctrines with only 3.7 other jurisdictions of the fifty-two.
50
The common-law view might seem a strong, unifying view, at least among a minority group, but this conclusion is a bit of an illusion.
51 While these jurisdictions are close enough to one another in their formulations to be grouped together in our tables (because they are dependent upon judicial formulation and development) they in fact have many differences among them, albeit of less dramatic effect than their differences with the Model-Penal-Codeinfluenced jurisdictions.
A second conclusion is that the analysis destroys any pleasant illusion some scholars might have had about the controlling effect of the Model Penal Code on these doctrines. The Model Penal Code has had an enormous effect in some areas, but these mitigations and excuses are an area in which it gained few converts. The Model Penal Code represents the minority view on each of the doctrines: only twenty-three of the fifty-two jurisdictions follow it on MINOE, only sixteen on insanity, and only twelve on EMED or EED.
52
A third conclusion follows from the perspective the survey gives on the influences on criminal law legislation. Consider, for example, what was referred to previously as the small-state effect. 53 It would seem that the Model Penal Code had a greater effect with these doctrines on the smaller states (by population). Note that such states are quite overrepresented in the upper-right-hand cells of Tables 1 through 6 (which always contain the broad Model Penal Code view). 54 This makes sense when one considers the common dynamics of the recodification process in the states. Smaller states presumably have smaller legislative staffs and reform budgets and may have less legislative activity generally. If they are able to successfully process legislation as gargantuan as a new criminal code, they may only be able to do so by largely 49 . See supra Tables 1-6. 50. 10x9 (10 states share with 9 others) + 6x5 + 10x4 + 14x2 + 6x1 + 6x0 = 194/52 = 3.7. See supra 
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following the model, with their legislative changes to the model limited to particularly prominent issues that happen to catch their attention. Note that some small states were never able to enact a new code. 55 Thus, the small-state distribution is a bit bimodal: either they enacted a code heavily influenced by the Model Penal Code or they failed to enact a modern recodification.
The large, populous states as a group show a different dynamic. Lots of legislative activity and lobbyist interest in debating, or blocking codification formulations they do not support, produced codes that were much more likely to alter the model. The big-state fights also produced their own share of failures to enact a modern criminal code, even after an enormous investment of time and effort. The repeated failures to recodify federal criminal law is the most dramatic example, but failures occurred in the states as well, as with California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. 56 Notice that many of the states that regularly appear in the cells taking the most narrow approach are populous, such as California (1st in population among the fifty states, including the District of Columbia), Louisiana (25th), Oklahoma (28th), South Carolina (24th), and Wisconsin (20th) . None of these five states successfully recodified their criminal laws during the wave sparked by the Model Penal Code.
57
Are most jurisdictions, in reaching their formulation decisions, making carefully reasoned analyses that take into account what they have done in other related doctrines? Scholars attempting to divine the underlying reason for a state's pattern of formulations may have to face the disappointing reality that there is often no underlying logic. How else can one explain the dizzying array of different combinations?
It may be that the formulation is as much a product of chance as logic. Did a headline case spark public unhappiness on an issue, as with the Hinckley insanity acquittal? What kind of debates are neighboring jurisdictions having, and do the states share media sources? What other codifications were complete when the state undertook its recodification? What kind of political compromises were needed to reach agreement on a formulation? All of these factors are independent of the wisdom and rationality of the resulting formulation. (1985) (listing all jurisdictions that enacted criminal code reform after promulgation of the Model Penal Code, as well as a number of jurisdictions that tried and failed).
